Billions from General Chereshnya and extortion of lawyers: how the Shevchenkivskyi court “buried” cases involving Hryshyn and Izovitova

02 травня 2026 р., 14:14

Petro Gavrischak 496 0

“General Chereshnya” profits from overpriced drones, while Izovitova has imposed a compulsory “subscription fee” on lawyers. A digest of arbitrariness at the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv.

The country is in its fourth year of war, but this has not stopped the Ministry of Defence from using old schemes. While the front needs fast and effective solutions, procurement has followed the same logic for months: buy at a higher price because the “right” supplier must receive the contract. Drones that could be purchased more cheaply and in large quantities are procured at inflated prices, while the difference ends up where everything has long since been agreed. The war is used as an argument, but the money is still distributed according to rules that have nothing to do with the front.

At the same time, the legal profession has simply been forced into becoming a controlled system. Izovitova has held onto the Ukrainian National Bar Association for years, hiding behind martial law and ignoring all term limits. Those who disagree are forced out through disciplinary proceedings, while loyalists remain in the system. There is no longer any self-governance or independence—only a clear rule: either you accept the decisions handed down from above, or you are pushed out of the profession. While the country is at war, these two stories operate in the same way: under the cover of ongoing events, issues are resolved at the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv, where anything can allegedly be “fixed” for a certain amount of money.

More details on each case below

“General Chereshnya” FPV drones: How the Ministry of Defence hands billions to its preferred suppliers

Читайте по темі: 186 мільйонів без торгів: АОЗ розпиляла перші підряди на бронекостюми між фірмами-одноденками

The “General Chereshnya” brand entered the market not as an engineering solution but as a media product—with large-scale promotion, frontline videos and a pool of loyal speakers. The key figure is Hryshyn, a lawyer linked to defence structures who previously represented the interests of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and the State Logistics Operator. This was followed by a telling personnel transfer: representatives of the state system moved into the private manufacturing company. The result was a network in which those who influence decisions are directly or indirectly connected to those receiving the contracts.

The FPV drone was not codified until 2025, when the market was already saturated with dozens of cheaper and more effective alternatives. Despite this, “General Chereshnya” was given priority in procurement through the Defence Procurement Agency. At the same time, military personnel participating in the “Army of Drones” programme chose other models that were cheaper and battle-tested. In other words, frontline demand and procurement decisions diverged. This indicates not competition, but the manual selection of a supplier.

After the change in the DPA’s leadership, the company linked to Hryshyn received contracts worth UAH 4.5 billion, while its sales volumes increased severalfold. The price per unit ranged from UAH 17,900 to UAH 39,000, while comparable products were available on the market for UAH 10,000–18,000. There were no technological advantages that could justify such a difference: this was a standard FPV drone built from Chinese components and subject to typical limitations. In effect, public funds were concentrated on a product offering no unique value.

Against this background, the lack of a response from the Security Service of Ukraine appears systemic. Despite all the apparent signs—inflated prices, personnel connections and the concentration of contracts—no public procedural steps have been taken. This creates a closed model in which procurement, the contractor and oversight effectively remain within the same circle, while billions in defence funding are distributed without genuine competition.

By a ruling of investigating judge Ye. O. Martynov of the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv in case No. 761/7461/26, the court refused to order the Security Service of Ukraine to initiate a pre-trial investigation into the stated facts.

Over the years, Yevhen Martynov has acquired the informal reputation of a “fixer” at the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv—a judge through whom a criminal case can allegedly be “buried” or a favourable position created for law enforcement agencies.

His name has repeatedly appeared in complaints submitted to the High Council of Justice, but none of them resulted even in the opening of proceedings. The result is consistent impunity, which only reinforces his influence within the judicial system.

The traffic accident involving the judge himself is a concentrated example of how this mechanism works. The incident was recorded by body cameras worn by officers of the Kyiv Patrol Police, part of the National Police of Ukraine, but the recordings subsequently effectively “disappeared.” The materials never reached the State Bureau of Investigation, and the information was not entered into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations. Without this, any investigation becomes impossible—the case falls apart before it even begins.

The same logic can be seen in his rulings. Martynov was among those who effectively helped Maidan judge Oksana Tsarevych avoid accountability. He also systematically issues decisions that benefit organized groups. These are not isolated episodes but a recurring pattern: refusal, lack of reasoning and obstruction of any progress in a case.

The Ukrainian National Bar Association on a “subscription fee”: How Lidiya Izovitova locked the legal profession into payments and disciplinary control

Читайте по темі: На Закарпатті викрили фіктивну мобілізацію 329 чоловіків: судитимуть сімох працівників ТЦК

The system of bar self-governance, which was supposed to guarantee the profession’s independence, has effectively lost that function during Lidiya Izovitova’s years in office. More than a decade without a change in leadership, disregard for term limits and the use of martial law as a convenient explanation have left lawyers without influence over their own institution. The Ukrainian National Bar Association has become a vertical structure in which decisions are made by a narrow circle, while any dissent is swiftly met with disciplinary measures.

The main lever is the “professional development” system, which has effectively become a mandatory paid model. Every year, a lawyer is required to earn points or face the risk of disciplinary action. Access to those points, however, has effectively been monopolized through the Higher School of Advocacy: registration, record-keeping and confirmation are all concentrated in one place. Without entering this system, a lawyer automatically falls into the category of non-compliance, creating direct dependence on paid events.

The financial aspect is no less revealing. The minimum cost of a single point creates a stable flow of funds that, across the profession, amounts to millions annually. At the same time, the Higher School of Advocacy has no licence to conduct educational activities, and there is no public reporting on how the money is used. These funds then pass through related entities—AMAN LLC, HOFFMANN SOLUTION DEVELOPMENT LLC and the audit firm INAUDIT V.I.G.—creating a closed model for distributing resources within the same circle.

Disciplinary pressure is used to keep the system under control. Mass complaints concerning a “lack of points,” submitted by the Higher School of Advocacy’s management, become an instrument of coercion, even though the Ukrainian National Bar Association has adopted no separate decisions granting such powers. As a result, lawyers face a choice with no alternative: operate within the imposed system or risk disciplinary prosecution. As long as this model remains in place, any attempts at reform will have no meaningful influence on the process.

Unfortunately, representatives of the judiciary, while disregarding the provisions of Ukraine’s Criminal Procedure Code, are also effectively blocking the initiation of pre-trial investigations. Investigating judge I. M. Mikhieieva of the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv, in case No. 761/14673/26, refused to order the Security Service of Ukraine to initiate a pre-trial investigation.

Judge I. M. Mikhieieva of the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv remains in office despite persistent questions about her reputation. Her name has been linked to a purported list of people close to Andriy Portnov, which automatically raises doubts about her ability to act free from political influence. In such a configuration, every ruling appears not merely as an act of justice but as a potential element of a broader network of connections in which judicial independence is no longer self-evident.

The financial side only deepens these doubts. According to the asset declaration, the judge’s husband reported a relatively modest annual income, yet a substantial amount of real estate and other property is registered in his name. Such a discrepancy between official income and actual assets appears unnatural even under the most optimistic explanations.

The alleged billion-hryvnia carve-up involving “General Chereshnya” drones and the compulsory “subscription fee” imposed on lawyers through Izovitova-linked structures have become two sides of the same system of enrichment from state and professional resources. Defence contracts at prices inflated twofold and the monopolization of paid professional-development points for lawyers exist only because of reliable judicial protection. Judges Martynov and Mikhieieva systematically “shut down” attempts to compel the Security Service of Ukraine to initiate investigations, turning judicial rulings into guarantees of peace of mind for those involved.